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    O and S must be the same ship — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    O and S must be the same ship

    Personal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.S eventuates from O by replacing one part of O one day at a time
      ?

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    • 2.Replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing
      ?

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    • 3.Identity is transitive
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hobbes's scenario stipulates that the original planks are reassembled into a ship, creating a rival candidate with equal or stronger claim to identity with O via spatiotemporal and material continuity.
      ?

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    • 2.When two distinct objects both satisfy the identity conditions for O, the relation 'same ship as' cannot be one-one, undermining the uniqueness presupposed by the claim that S must be O.
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    • 3.Wiggins's thesis that identity statements require a sortal concept under which exactly one continuant qualifies entails that 'same ship' fails here, leaving the identity claim indeterminate rather than true.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Gradual replacement preserves identity only if no threshold exists, but Chisholm's mereological essentialism holds that any part replacement yields a numerically distinct object.
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    • 2.If Chisholm is correct, P2 is false even for single-part replacement, and the transitivity chain in the supporting argument never gets started.
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    Topics

    Personal Identity

    Connections

    1 linked claim · 1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked
    S and S' are the same ship

    Related

    Gradual replacement preserves identity only if no threshold exists, but Chisholm...Hobbes's scenario stipulates that the original planks are reassembled into a shi...Identity is transitiveIf Chisholm is correct, P2 is false even for single-part replacement, and the tr...
    +5 moreShow less
    Replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar part preserves the i...S and S' are the same shipS eventuates from O by replacing one part of O one day at a timeWhen two distinct objects both satisfy the identity conditions for O, the relati...Wiggins's thesis that identity statements require a sortal concept under which e...

    Similar

    S and S' are the same ship95%O and S cannot be the same ship95%O and S are not the same ship in the actual world94%O and O' are distinct ships91%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-relative
    View source passageHide passage
    If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim to being the original ship, \(O\). But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at a time. There seems to be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit