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    Carmelics

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    It is not the case that On a Barnes-Williams ontic vagueness account, the world itself can be unsettled, so Leibniz's Law governs only determinate property-possession, not indeterminate cases.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Restricting Leibniz's Law undermines its status as a fundamental logical principle governing identity; selective application suggests ad hoc theoretical maneuvering.
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    • 2.Ontic vagueness itself is metaphysically obscure—it's unclear how indeterminacy could exist 'in reality' rather than in our descriptions or knowledge of reality.
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    • 3.If identity is determinate while properties can be indeterminate, we face the difficult question of what determines identity facts if not complete property possession.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Ontic vagueness posits that reality itself contains indeterminacy, not merely epistemic limitations or linguistic imprecision about determinate facts.
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    • 2.If two objects differ only in indeterminate respects, applying Leibniz's Law would paradoxically require them to be identical despite real ontological differences.
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    • 3.Restricting Leibniz's Law to determinate properties preserves classical logic's validity while accommodating genuinely unsettled metaphysical states.
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