Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    On a Plantinga-style approach, God cannot be identical wi... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    On a Plantinga-style approach, God cannot be identical with existence.

    Divine Attributes
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For Plantinga, existence is a first-level property that everything exemplifies.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.'Exemplifies' picks out a two-term irreflexive and asymmetrical relation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Given that the exemplification relation is irreflexive and asymmetrical, nothing can be identical with a property it exemplifies.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Plantinga's framework allows properties to be self-exemplifying in some cases, e.g., the property of being abstract is itself abstract.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If self-exemplification is coherent for some properties, the asymmetry argument fails to categorically block God's identity with existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.God's existence may be a sui generis case where the exemplification relation is not irreflexive, distinguishing divine from creaturely existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On a Fregean reading compatible with Plantinga, existence as a second-level property applies to concepts, not objects, leaving first-level property talk revisable.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If existence-talk about God is systematically different from existence-talk about contingent beings, the asymmetry premise applies only equivocally across both cases.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Divine Attributes

    Related

    'Exemplifies' picks out a two-term irreflexive and asymmetrical relation.For Plantinga, existence is a first-level property that everything exemplifies.Given that the exemplification relation is irreflexive and asymmetrical, nothing...God's existence may be a sui generis case where the exemplification relation is ...
    +4 moreShow less
    If existence-talk about God is systematically different from existence-talk abou...If self-exemplification is coherent for some properties, the asymmetry argument ...On a Fregean reading compatible with Plantinga, existence as a second-level prop...Plantinga's framework allows properties to be self-exemplifying in some cases, e...

    Similar

    On a Plantinga-style approach, God cannot be identical to his existenc...93%Essence and existence are identical, not distinct.84%Essence and existence are really identical and differ only conceptuall...82%Essence and existence are really identical but differ intentionally.81%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: divine-simplicity
    View source passageHide passage
    According to the classical theism of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and their adherents, God is radically unlike creatures and cannot be adequately understood in ways appropriate to them. God is simple in that God transcends every form of complexity and composition familiar to the discursive intellect. One consequence is that the simple God lacks parts. This lack is not a deficiency but a positive feature. God is ontologically superior to every partite entity, and his partlessness is an index thereof. Broadly construed, ‘part’ covers not only spatial and temporal parts (if any) but also metaphysic...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit