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It is not the case that On Chomskyan internalist semantics, meaning ascription is grounded in I-language states, making such claims part of psychology, not metasemantics.
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1.
I-language states underdetermine truth conditions; identical internal states can differ in reference given different external contexts.
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2.
Meaning ascriptions make normative claims about correctness; psychology describes only what is, not what semantically should be.
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3.
Excluding social and historical context from semantics ignores how linguistic communities establish and sustain meaning conventions.
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Reason against
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1.
Meaning must be located somewhere concrete; I-language states are the only internal locus available to grounding semantic facts.
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2.
Psychology studies internal mental states; if meanings are I-language states, then meaning ascription is a psychological inquiry.
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3.
Metasemantics asks what makes semantic claims true; it presupposes meaning exists, but doesn't locate its physical basis.
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