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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that On Kantian grounds, rational agency is the condition of possibility for all moral value, creating a duty to preserve it that is not reducible to individual preference (Groundwork 4:429).

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Rational agency alone cannot ground moral value if some rational agents act immorally; rationality and morality are logically distinct capacities.
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    • 2.Many entities we consider morally valuable—ecosystems, sentient beings—lack rational agency but possess intrinsic worth independent of Kantian grounds.
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    • 3.Declaring rational agency the sole condition of moral value risks justifying exploitation of non-rational beings and obscures our duties to them.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Moral laws must apply universally to all rational beings, requiring a ground independent of individual desires or contingent preferences.
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    • 2.Only rational agency possesses the capacity for autonomous self-legislation, distinguishing moral action from mere inclination or coercion.
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    • 3.Treating rational agency as unconditionally valuable avoids circularity: we cannot derive duties from preferences without presupposing rational agency.
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