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Inverse View
It is not the case that On Plantinga's own actualist semantics, propositions have truth-values at worlds they are merely 'about', without being located there.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Truth-value assignment requires some grounding relation; 'aboutness' alone underdetermines how propositions gain truth-values.
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2.
If propositions lack location at worlds, it's unclear what makes their truth-values at those worlds non-arbitrary or non-conventional.
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3.
This view risks collapsing the distinction between a proposition being true-at-W and merely having truth-conditions concerning W.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Propositions must have determinate truth-values at all possible worlds to serve their function in modal logic and metaphysics.
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2.
A proposition's being 'about' a world sufficiently grounds its having truth-conditions there, regardless of spatial location.
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3.
Actualism avoids postulating merely possible entities by allowing abstract propositions to evaluate worlds without inhabiting them.
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