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Inverse View
It is not the case that On realist universals ontology, a shared nature constitutes a genuine ontological entity distinct from its particular instances.
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Reasons For
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1.
If universals are distinct entities, they require their own ontological ground; this regresses infinitely unless we accept brute facts anyway.
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2.
Nominalist accounts (resemblance classes, conceptualism) explain apparent similarities without positing transcendent entities, applying Occam's razor.
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3.
Universals allegedly exist outside spacetime, yet causally influence particulars—raising unanswered questions about mechanism and epistemological access.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Multiple distinct objects share identical properties (two red balls are both red), requiring a common entity to ground this genuine similarity.
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2.
Abstract mathematical and logical truths (like 'redness itself') possess mind-independent properties that particulars instantiate, not merely resemblances.
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3.
Predicates like 'is human' refer to something real; denying universals makes predication mysterious and reduces properties to mere linguistic convenience.
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