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It is not the case that On reductionism, there is no principled barrier preventing earlier psychological chains from constituting the same person, contra Kaufman's modal claim.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Psychological chain overlap across persons (memory-sharing, trait inheritance) shows reductionist criteria admit unwanted identities.
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2.
Even reductionists must distinguish actual psychological constitution from mere continuity to avoid counterintuitive collapsing of persons.
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3.
Temporal direction and causal-historical context matter for identity even on reductionism, providing principled barriers Kaufman needs.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Reductionism denies that personal identity requires metaphysically primitive facts beyond physical/psychological continuity.
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2.
If identity consists only in overlapping psychological chains, earlier chains can qualify if they share sufficient continuity.
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3.
Kaufman's modal barrier assumes non-reductive facts that reductionism rejects, so reductionists have no grounds to accept it.
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