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    On the individualist-compatible account, kind membership ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If individualism about species is correct, kind membership cannot be necessarily intrinsic

    On the individualist-compatible account, kind membership is defined as 'being a part of a species-individual'

    Philosophy of Language
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    'Being a part of y' is not an intrinsic property

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    If individualism about species is correct, kind membership cannot be necessarily...
    Parts of the same entity do not necessarily share any intrinsic properties

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    If individualism about species is correct, kind membership cannot be n...87%Kind membership under the individualist-compatible account is defined ...81%Where one theorist sees a species-as-kind and an organism-as-member, a...77%According to the BSC, membership of a species depends on relational pr...76%

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    Does individualism about species imply that species are not natural kinds? One might suspect as much, but perhaps the two views are compatible. LaPorte (2004), for example, believes that one can consistently hold both views. Where one theorist will see a species-as-kind and an organism-as-member of that kind, another theorist will see a species-as-individual and an organism-as-part of that kind. And so even allowing that individualism is correct, we can construct a kind: if S is a species-indivi

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