Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Only sensations whose content is independently describabl... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Bodily knowledge of limb position is a form of knowledge without observation

    Only sensations whose content is independently describable can play an epistemic role

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    PerceptionTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Bodily knowledge of limb position is a form of knowledge without observationKnowledge of limb position is not grounded in any sensation or observationSensations of position do not have independently describable content

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Perception
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Kumārila's epistemological project must apply to all contentful cognit...77%Humans derive intellectual content from sensation directly or through ...77%All concepts derive from sensations.77%Individual experience provides genuine epistemic value77%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: bodily-awareness
    View source passageHide passage
    A different type of criticism of the perceptual model of bodily awareness can be found in Wittgenstein (1978), and later Anscombe (1962). They claim that the ability to report how the limbs are located and how they move does not depend on sensations of position. It thus differs from perceptual knowledge. I know that the sky is blue in virtue of having a visual experience of the blueness of the sky but I know that my legs are crossed independently of any sensation. According to Anscombe, bodily k

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective