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    Optative validity can be defined in terms of fulfillment:... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Valid logical arguments about goodness are possible even if moral judgments are optative (expressions of desire) rather than truth-apt statements.

    Optative validity can be defined in terms of fulfillment: an optative sentence Q is the logical consequence of a set of optative sentences P and factual sentences C if and only if the desires expressed in P cannot be fulfilled under circumstances C unless the desire expressed by Q is fulfilled too.

    Philosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of Language

    Key Terms

    Factual sentences(as used in logic)
    Statements that describe how things actually are in the world, as opposed to how someone wishes or hopes they would be.
    Fulfilled (in context of desires)(as used in ethics and logic)
    When a desire or wish actually comes true or is satisfied in reality.
    logical consequence(WL II, 391–395; noted as similar to Tarski 1956, 419)
    A proposition s is a logical consequence of a set of premises σ if and only if s follows from σ with respect to the sequence of all extra-logical simple ideas contained in σ or s.

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    optative(Used to characterize how non-cognitivist theories treat evaluative terms in embedded/unasserted positions)
    A semantic kind for expressions like 'X is good' when used in unasserted contexts, where the expression functions as an expression of desire or wish rather than a truth-apt claim
    validity(Formal logic; distinguished from syntactic deducibility)
    The model-theoretic counterpart to deducibility; an argument is valid if its conclusion is true under every interpretation in which its premises are true

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    An optative argument is valid if and only if the conclusion is an optative conse...Optative sentences have fulfillment conditions analogous to the truth-conditions...Valid logical arguments about goodness are possible even if moral judgments are ...

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    An optative argument is valid if and only if the conclusion is an opta...83%Optative sentences have fulfillment conditions analogous to the truth-...82%A sentence infected by an optative clause — 'X leads to more of what [...80%A sentence in the optative mood cannot be true or false79%

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    SEP: russell-moral
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    This is a telling objection against some forms of emotivism which portray moral judgments as mere expressions of raw feeling, analogous to cries of ecstasy or groans of pain. But Russell is better placed to meet this difficulty, since in his view judgments about what is ultimately good and bad are disguised optatives, designed to express desires or wishes of a certain kind. And it is possible to construct a rudimentary concept of logical consequence (and hence of validity) that applies to argume

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