Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Organisms (living composite objects) do exist. — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Organisms (living composite objects) do exist.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Van Inwagen believes that he himself exists.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Van Inwagen is a composite material object.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Van Inwagen's mereological nihilism has a stopping point that exempts organisms from eliminativism.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.There is no non-arbitrary principled boundary distinguishing organisms from other composite objects that would justify differential ontological treatment.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If mereological composition is either universally permissive or universally restricted, van Inwagen's 'life' criterion smuggles in biological essentialism without metaphysical justification.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A fully deflationary physicalism entails that 'organism' is a folk-biological predicate tracking causal patterns, not a fundamental ontological category picking out genuine entities.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Eliminativist accounts like Unger's and Merricks's show that all macro-level objects, including organisms, are ontologically redundant given the causal completeness of microphysical particles.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If organisms exist only because their parts collectively instantiate 'life', then the organism adds no causal work beyond what its simples already accomplish, satisfying no parsimony-respecting criterion for existence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    A fully deflationary physicalism entails that 'organism' is a folk-biological pr...Eliminativist accounts like Unger's and Merricks's show that all macro-level obj...If mereological composition is either universally permissive or universally rest...If organisms exist only because their parts collectively instantiate 'life', the...
    +4 moreShow less
    There is no non-arbitrary principled boundary distinguishing organisms from othe...Van Inwagen believes that he himself exists.Van Inwagen is a composite material object.Van Inwagen's mereological nihilism has a stopping point that exempts organisms ...

    Similar

    There exist composite things in reality88%Van Inwagen is a composite material object.84%The existence of a composite entity entails the existence of its const...82%Propositions are abstract objects that exist necessarily.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: substance
    View source passageHide passage
    Van Inwagen’s main argument is that necessary and sufficient (particularly sufficient) conditions cannot be given for the kind of cohesion of parts that is supposed to bind atoms into complexes. None of the standard candidates—contact, fastening, adhesion, fusion, nor any acceptable disjunction of them—will suffice. They all have counterexamples. So the notion cannot be well defined. The arguments are subtle and interesting. The question might be raised whether van Inwagen gives sufficient consi
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit