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    Oscar− lacks the property at t' of having had a tail at t — Carmelics
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    Supports→Oscar and Oscar− are distinct at t'

    Oscar− lacks the property at t' of having had a tail at t

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

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    By the Necessity of Identity (NI) / Necessity of Distinctness (ND), objects diff...Oscar and Oscar− are distinct at t'Oscar has the property at t' of having had a tail at t

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Oscar has the property at t' of having had a tail at t95%Oscar− is what remains when Oscar loses his tail, and it is present at...75%Oscar− does not survive the loss of Oscar's tail72%Both Oscar and Oscar− survive the loss of the tail and exist at t'72%

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    SEP: identity-relative
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    The following paradox — a variation of the paradox of change — raises some new questions. It is due to the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (c.280 B.C.E. – c.206 B.C.E.) and has been resurrected by Michael Burke (Burke 1994). In Chrysippus’s example, ‘Dion’ is the name of a human and ‘Theon’ is the name of the proper part of Dion that includes everything but his [Dion’s] left foot. Dion then loses his foot and Chrysippus wishes to know which of those objects — Dion or Theon — survives after Dion los

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