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    Our belief in other minds is not properly warranted, beca... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Our belief in other minds is not properly warranted, because it rests on a poor argument from analogy.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's private language argument shows inner mental states cannot be meaningfully grounded in purely first-person ostensive definition.
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    • 2.If mental concepts require public criteria for their very meaning, then inferring others' minds from one's own private case is conceptually incoherent.
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    • 3.An inference whose starting point is philosophically illegitimate cannot confer warrant on its conclusion, regardless of how many instances support it.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.P.F. Strawson demonstrated that even our self-ascription of mental predicates logically presupposes their third-person ascribability to others.
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    • 2.If the analogical argument were our epistemic foundation for other minds, self-knowledge of mental states would be prior to and independent of interpersonal criteria, contradicting Strawson's finding.
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    • 3.A proposed warrant that contradicts the logical structure of the very concepts it invokes cannot itself constitute genuine epistemic warrant.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Our belief in other minds appears to be grounded solely on the observed link between behaviour and mentality in our own case.
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    • 2.Extending a single observed instance (oneself) to all others is an inadequate inductive base.
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    • 3.An inference from a single instance is a poor argument from analogy that does not warrant the conclusion.
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    Topics

    SkepticismConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    A proposed warrant that contradicts the logical structure of the very concepts i...An inference from a single instance is a poor argument from analogy that does no...An inference whose starting point is philosophically illegitimate cannot confer ...Extending a single observed instance (oneself) to all others is an inadequate in...
    +5 moreShow less
    If mental concepts require public criteria for their very meaning, then inferrin...If the analogical argument were our epistemic foundation for other minds, self-k...Our belief in other minds appears to be grounded solely on the observed link bet...P.F. Strawson demonstrated that even our self-ascription of mental predicates lo...Wittgenstein's private language argument shows inner mental states cannot be mea...

    Similar

    The simple argument from analogy is a weak justification for belief in...91%Our belief in other minds is warranted, even if fallible, because it i...87%The traditional argument from analogy for other minds relies on observ...84%The analogical argument for other minds is significantly weaker when a...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: transcendental-arguments
    View source passageHide passage
    Finally, in Stern 2000, it is argued that modest transcendental arguments can be shown to be useful against skepticism, once we distinguish sufficiently carefully between the kinds of skepticism there are, and go for the right target or targets—where a less demanding form of skepticism may perhaps be defeated by a less ambitious transcendental claim. So, for example, if we take the target to be a skeptic who demands certainty, then a modest transcendental argument will not suffice. But if we tak
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit