Our conceivability judgments about consciousness are systematically unreliable because we lack third-person access to the physical-phenomenal relationship (Levine's 'explanatory gap').

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Levine, Joseph(His work challenges Loar's position): A philosopher who identified a major problem in philosophy of mind: the difficulty of explaining why physical facts about the brain never seem to fully explain what experiences are actually like.
Physical-phenomenal relationship(as used in philosophy of mind): The connection between physical things (like brain processes you can measure) and phenomenal things (like subjective experiences only you can feel); how the two relate to each other.
Systematically unreliable(the weaker claim the Cretan might actually be trying to communicate): Consistently or regularly untrustworthy—describing a pattern where someone or something regularly fails to be accurate or truthful.
Third-person access(as used in epistemology): Information you can observe objectively from the outside (like measuring brain activity), rather than experiencing directly yourself; what other people can measure and verify.

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