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    Panpsychism per se is not inconsistent with physicalism. — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→The real issue in the objection to physicalism is not panpsychism itself, but the possibility that the paradigms used to characterize the physical might turn out to be essentially mental.

    Panpsychism per se is not inconsistent with physicalism.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.The existence of some conscious beings is not contrary to physicalism.
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    • 2.If the existence of some conscious beings is compatible with physicalism, then the possibility that everything is a conscious being is also compatible with physicalism.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Physicalism requires that all facts supervene on physical facts characterized by physics, which makes no reference to intrinsic experiential properties.
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    • 2.Panpsychism posits that micro-level entities possess intrinsic phenomenal properties irreducible to the structural-relational properties physics describes.
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    • 3.Therefore panpsychism introduces a category of fundamental facts that violates the supervenience base physicalism requires, making them incompatible.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The supporting argument's inference from 'some conscious beings exist compatibly with physicalism' to 'everything being conscious is compatible' commits a fallacy of composition.
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    • 2.Physicalism permits consciousness only where it is realized by sufficiently complex physical organization, as Jaegwon Kim's realization view requires.
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    • 3.Universal attribution of consciousness to all physical entities, including electrons, entails consciousness without functional or organizational realization, which Kim-style physicalism explicitly prohibits.
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    If the existence of some conscious beings is compatible with physicalism, then t...Panpsychism posits that micro-level entities possess intrinsic phenomenal proper...Physicalism permits consciousness only where it is realized by sufficiently comp...Physicalism requires that all facts supervene on physical facts characterized by...
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    The existence of some conscious beings is not contrary to physicalism.The objection becomes substantive only if the exemplars used to define 'the phys...The real issue in the objection to physicalism is not panpsychism itself, but th...The supporting argument's inference from 'some conscious beings exist compatibly...Therefore panpsychism introduces a category of fundamental facts that violates t...Universal attribution of consciousness to all physical entities, including elect...

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    Supervenience physicalism does not entail fundamentality physicalism.86%Token physicalism does not provide a necessary condition for physicali...86%Type physicalism is not a necessary condition for physicalism85%Supervenience is not a sufficient condition for physicalism85%

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    One thing to say in response to this objection is that the mere possibility of panpsychism cannot really be what is at issue here. For panpsychism per se is not inconsistent with physicalism (cf. Lewis 1983). After all, the fact that there are some conscious beings is not contrary to physicalism — why then should the possibility that everything is a conscious being be contrary to physicalism? If so, what is at issue in the objection is not panpsychism so much as the possibility that the paradigm

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