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Inverse View
It is not the case that Parfit's reductionism entails that personal identity is not a deep further fact but is constituted by overlapping chains of psychological connectedness.
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Reasons For
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1.
Psychological continuity admits of degrees, yet identity is binary; reductionism cannot explain why identity has all-or-nothing metaphysical status.
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2.
The very notion of 'overlapping chains' presupposes facts about which experiences belong to the same person—requiring identity facts prior to psychology.
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3.
If identity is merely constituted by relations, what grounds the unified experiencing of those psychological states in a single subject at any moment?
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Personal identity over time correlates perfectly with psychological continuity; no identity facts exist independent of these continuities.
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2.
The bundle theory successfully explains personal identity without positing a mysterious metaphysical 'self' beyond mental states and connections.
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3.
Overlapping chains allow for gradual changes in identity without requiring an unchanging substance, matching how we actually persist.
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