Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity entails that the agent who acted and the agent who might 'reverse' the act are not numerically identical, making artifact-repair and action-reversal symmetrically impossible for the same agent.
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Reductionist account of personal identity(as the theory framework being applied)
The view that being the same person over time doesn't require having one continuous soul or essence; instead, identity is just a matter of having the right connections between your memories and experiences.
Symmetrically impossible(as describing the relationship between artifact-repair and action-reversal)
Unable to happen in both directions equally—meaning if you can't do X, you also can't do the opposite of X, for the same reason.