Parfit's reductionist view of personal identity entails that 'long-term survival of oneself' is not a coherent ultimate end, since future selves are not strictly identical to present ones.
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Logically forces or guarantees; if A entails B, then whenever A is true, B must also be true.
reductionist view of personal identity(as the core philosophical position being discussed)
The idea that personal identity (what makes you the same person over time) can be broken down into simpler physical and psychological facts, rather than being some special, irreducible feature of consciousness.
ultimate end(Hutcheson's critique of fitness-based ethics)
An end that is not fit in virtue of giving rise to some other thing.