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Inverse View
It is not the case that Paull and Sider (1992) demonstrated that under standard mereological assumptions, global supervenience and strong supervenience are provably equivalent.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The equivalence proof relies on controversial mereological axioms (unrestricted composition) that many contemporary metaphysicians reject.
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2.
Strong supervenience requires necessity de re, whose modal status differs from global supervenience's de dicto necessity across possible worlds.
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3.
The proof may conflate metaphysical grounding with logical supervenience, obscuring whether the result has substantive metaphysical implications.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Standard mereology provides determinate identity conditions for wholes based on parts, enabling rigorous proof of supervenience equivalence.
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2.
Global supervenience (same worlds → same properties) and strong supervenience (necessity + same intrinsic properties → same) are formally related under compositional constraints.
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3.
Paull and Sider's proof demonstrates that denying equivalence leads to contradictions within standard mereological frameworks.
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