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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Perdurance theory, defended by David Lewis in 'On the Plurality of Worlds,' holds that objects persist by having distinct temporal parts at each moment.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Temporal parts are unobservable: we never perceive distinct temporal parts—we perceive only the object as it is now, making this ontology unnecessarily speculative.
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    • 2.The theory conflicts with our intuitive persistence: we experience ourselves as unified wholes persisting through time, not as collections of momentary stages.
      ?

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    • 3.Perdurance is unmotivated by physics: relativity doesn't require temporal parts—alternative theories like endurance explain change without multiplying entities.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Temporal parts explain change: an object's properties can differ across time because distinct temporal parts have different properties at each moment.
      ?

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    • 2.Perdurance provides ontological consistency with how we treat spatial parts—objects have spatial parts, so having temporal parts is metaphysically parallel.
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    • 3.This view solves the problem of temporary intrinsics: properties like 'being bent' apply to temporal stages, avoiding contradiction across time.
      ?

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