Peter Davies and Paul Dretske's reliabilist frameworks ground justification in truth-conducive processes, not in the structural relationship between conditions (i), (ii), and (iii+).

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Paul Dretske(as a philosopher cited for reliabilist frameworks): An influential philosopher known for developing theories about knowledge, belief, and how the mind represents the world.
Peter Davies(as a philosopher cited for reliabilist frameworks): A contemporary philosopher who works on questions about knowledge and how we know things are true.
Structural relationship between conditions (i), (ii), and (iii+)(as what reliabilism does NOT rely on, contrasting with other theories): The logical arrangement and connections between a list of requirements or criteria (likely referring to definitions of knowledge that use numbered conditions).
Truth-conducive processes(as used in epistemology): Methods or ways of thinking that actually lead you toward true beliefs, like careful observation or logical reasoning.
justification(Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge): The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.
reliabilism(epistemology): A theory holding that a belief is knowledge if it is true and if it was produced or is sustained by a reliable process that yields mostly true beliefs

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