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Inverse View
It is not the case that Peter Sedgwick's constructivist critique argues illness judgments are entirely value-laden, making appeal to causal antecedents philosophically secondary.
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1.
Biological dysfunction (e.g., kidney failure preventing homeostasis) constrains which conditions can be rationally judged pathological.
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2.
Causal etiology often causally explains why something is judged illness; values alone cannot generate medical knowledge without facts.
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3.
Even radically relativist frameworks must appeal to some biological mechanism to distinguish illness from preference or choice.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Medical categories like 'disease' reflect social priorities about functioning, not purely objective biological facts.
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2.
The same biological state receives different illness judgments across cultures, showing value-systems determine classifications.
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3.
Causal mechanisms explain *why* something occurs but cannot determine *whether* it counts as pathological without normative input.
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