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Inverse View
It is not the case that Peter van Inwagen's materialist resurrection model—God preserves the exact corpse and reconstitutes it—demonstrates a coherent physicalist afterlife framework.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The model requires God to miraculously preserve matter scattered across billions of years—requiring unexplained metaphysical mechanisms.
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2.
Identity through material continuity alone cannot ground psychological continuity, undermining what makes the resurrected person *me*.
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3.
The model implausibly requires God to track every atom from billions of deceased humans across cosmic time without physical infrastructure.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Van Inwagen's model avoids Platonic dualism by keeping the afterlife physically grounded in actual matter, preserving physicalist ontology.
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2.
God's preservation of the original corpse solves the composition problem: the resurrected person is numerically identical to the original.
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3.
This framework matches ordinary intuitions about personal identity better than competing materialist models like gradual replacement or fission.
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