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Inverse View
It is not the case that Phenomenal character is itself constitutive of representational content for sensory states, not merely a symptom of it (Shoemaker, 'The Inverted Spectrum').
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Conceivability of inverted spectra doesn't entail metaphysical possibility; neurobiological constraints may make such inversions impossible.
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2.
Representational content depends on external causal-historical relations, not intrinsic phenomenal properties, per externalist theories of content.
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3.
Two organisms with identical functional organizations and causal histories should have identical representational contents, regardless of phenomenal differences.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Inverted spectrum scenarios are conceivable only if phenomenal character can vary while functional/behavioral roles remain constant.
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2.
If two states have identical functional profiles but different qualia, their representational content must differ, making phenomenal character constitutive.
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3.
The explanatory gap between physical properties and qualia suggests phenomenal character carries representational information beyond physical facts.
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