Philosophers like Parsons (2007) defend location as a fundamental relation irreducible to identity, so Supersubstantivalism+ cannot derive NXS without begging the question against relational accounts.
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Parsons (2007)(as a reference to a specific philosopher's position)
Josh Parsons is a philosopher who published work in 2007 arguing about how things exist in space and time; this citation refers to that specific published argument.
Relational accounts(theory of perception)
Explanations of perception that say seeing something requires a real relationship between you and the actual object in front of you—you can't 'see' something that isn't really there.
Supersubstantivalism+(A strengthened form of supersubstantivalism used to derive NXS)
The thesis that it is a necessary truth that each entity is identical to anything at which it is exactly located.
begging the question(Listed alongside equivocation as an example of a fallacy that highlights important issues in real-life arguing)
A fallacy also known as circular reasoning
irreducible(Personalist anthropology; distinguishes personhood from mere biological individuality)
That which is unique and unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue of which a person is not merely an individual of a species but a personal subject.