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    Carmelics

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    Physicalism is false. — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Physicalism is false.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mary the color scientist gains genuinely new propositional knowledge upon seeing red for the first time, as Jackson (1982) argues.
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    • 2.If physicalism were true, Mary would already know all facts about color experience from her complete physical knowledge.
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    • 3.Therefore, there exist facts about conscious experience that are not captured by any complete physical description of the world.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chalmers' hard problem identifies an explanatory gap: no functional or structural account explains why physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience.
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    • 2.Levine's explanatory gap is not merely epistemic—the absence of any conceivable reductive explanation reflects an ontological discontinuity between physical and phenomenal properties.
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    • 3.If phenomenal properties cannot be derived even in principle from physical properties, then phenomenal facts are not physical facts.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Ghosts (pure subjects of experience without any physical nature) are conceivable.
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    • 2.Ghosts are possible.
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    • 3.If ghosts are possible, physicalism is false.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility3 linked

    Related

    Chalmers' hard problem identifies an explanatory gap: no functional or structura...Ghosts (pure subjects of experience without any physical nature) are conceivable...Ghosts are possible.If ghosts are possible, physicalism is false.
    +5 moreShow less
    If phenomenal properties cannot be derived even in principle from physical prope...If physicalism were true, Mary would already know all facts about color experien...Levine's explanatory gap is not merely epistemic—the absence of any conceivable ...Mary the color scientist gains genuinely new propositional knowledge upon seeing...Therefore, there exist facts about conscious experience that are not captured by...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: zombies
    View source passageHide passage
    Philip Goff (2010) suggests that this loophole for Russellian versions of physicalism weakens the zombie argument. He recommends instead an argument from ghosts: pure subjects of experience without any physical nature. He argues that such ghosts are conceivable and possible, and that they provide an argument against physicalism which leaves no loophole for Russellian monism. (Physicalists are likely to object that arguments against the conceivability of zombies can also be mobilized against ghos
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit