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Inverse View
It is not the case that Physicalism requires that all facts supervene on physical facts, and supervenience without type identity collapses into an unexplained brute correlation.
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Reasons For
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1.
Brute facts aren't rationally objectionable: fundamental physics accepts unexplained brute facts (why these constants?). Mental supervenience needn't differ.
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2.
Type identity faces its own explanatory burden: why should consciousness *be* identical to neural firing rather than merely supervene on it?
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3.
Non-reductive physicalism coherently denies type identity while maintaining physical closure: distinct properties can be co-determined without mystery.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Brute correlations violate explanatory completeness: physics should explain why mental facts cooccur with brain states, not just that they do.
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2.
Type identity preserves causal closure: if mental properties are distinct from physical ones, mental causation becomes epiphenomenal or overdetermines.
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3.
Supervenience without identity leaves a 'why' question unanswered: what grounds the correlation between distinct property types?
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