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Inverse View
It is not the case that Plausible metaphysical principles may entail that whenever a global supervenience thesis holds, a weak or strong supervenience thesis also holds.
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Reasons For
2 perspectives
Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
Kim's (1984) counterexamples show global supervenience is compatible with radical property-level variance across worlds, blocking strong supervenience.
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2.
Metaphysical principles strong enough to close this gap would themselves presuppose modal constraints stronger than global supervenience licenses.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
Paull and Sider (1992) demonstrated formally that global supervenience does not entail even weak supervenience without auxiliary assumptions about world-cardinality.
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2.
Any 'plausible metaphysical principle' doing the entailment work must be independently justified, making the supervenience hierarchy collapse non-trivially expensive.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
A global supervenience thesis does not entail weak or strong supervenience by logical form alone.
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2.
Metaphysical principles beyond logical form can establish connections between supervenience theses.
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