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    Possibilities not clearly and distinctly perceived are no... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Possibilities which exist only in thought are not possibilities at all on Descartes' view.

    Possibilities not clearly and distinctly perceived are not part of Descartes' ontology.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

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    If a possibility exists only in thought, there is no object to which the concept...If a possibility is clearly and distinctly perceived, there must be an object to...Possibilities which exist only in thought are not possibilities at all on Descar...Truth is the conformity of thought with its object.
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    Whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true.

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    SEP: descartes-modal
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    These alleged possibilities (if they are anything) would be among all of the other creatures; they would be actuals. It might of course be the case that Descartes just insists that there are possible existents in addition to actual existents. Alternately, it might be the case that like Spinoza (in Ethics Part IV, definitions three and four), Descartes uses the expression “possible existence” to describe actually-existing creatures, and in a way that is consistent with a denial of non-actual rea

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