Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Predicative types inherit their representational features... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Predicative types inherit their representational features from both their actual and possible tokens.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Even if no one has ever tokened a proposition, it can have truth-conditions if someone could counterfactually token it.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The counterfactual token would have truth-conditions grounded in the world (e.g., a token predicating eloquence of Clinton would be true iff Clinton is eloquent).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, the type inherits its truth-conditions from the possible token.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Possible tokens are abstract posits with no causal-representational powers; only actual tokenings generate genuine semantic content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Invoking merely possible tokens to ground truth-conditions smuggles in irreducibly modal facts, making the account explanatorily circular.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's skeptical argument shows that no fact about past or possible use fixes a unique meaning for an expression, undermining rule-following for types.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If possible tokens cannot determinately instantiate a type's representational rule, they cannot reliably transmit truth-conditions to the type.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Even if no one has ever tokened a proposition, it can have truth-conditions if s...If possible tokens cannot determinately instantiate a type's representational ru...Invoking merely possible tokens to ground truth-conditions smuggles in irreducib...Kripke's skeptical argument shows that no fact about past or possible use fixes ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Possible tokens are abstract posits with no causal-representational powers; only...The counterfactual token would have truth-conditions grounded in the world (e.g....Therefore, the type inherits its truth-conditions from the possible token.

    Similar

    Propositions, on the type view, derive their representational features...89%Without tokens to derive representational features from, uninstantiate...88%Types inherit certain kinds of properties from their tokens.86%Therefore, the type inherits its truth-conditions from the possible to...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: propositions
    View source passageHide passage
    A concern for the type view is whether there will be “missing propositions” — truths or falsehoods which have never been entertained. One drawn to the type view may allow for the existence of uninstantiated types to account for the existence of these propositions. However, given that propositions are claimed to derive their representational features from their tokens, such uninstantiated types would lack representational features, and so lack truth-conditions. Hanks suggests dealing with such
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit