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Inverse View
It is not the case that Prima facie duties, as Rossian deontology holds, are defeasible but not probabilistic — they bind categorically unless overridden by stronger duties.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If duties are truly categorical unless overridden, the theory must explain what 'categorical' means—if it's merely 'very strong,' it collapses into probabilism anyway.
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2.
Real moral deliberation often requires weighing partial considerations: keeping a promise versus preventing serious harm involves gradual trade-offs, not binary duty-clash logic.
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3.
The distinction between defeasible and probabilistic is unclear: if duty-strength determines which overrides, that strength-comparison resembles probability calculus.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Moral duties feel categorically binding in everyday experience—we don't weigh promises probabilistically but treat them as absolute unless genuine conflicts arise.
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2.
Defeasibility without probabilism avoids the problem of calculating precise moral weights, which seems impossible and unfitting for ethical reasoning.
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3.
This framework preserves moral realism: duties exist objectively and bind us, yet allows practical flexibility when duties genuinely conflict.
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