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It is not the case that Probabilistic arguments establish epistemic conclusions about rational credence, not metaphysical conclusions about God's existence.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If a probabilistic argument gives us rational credence of 0.99 in God's existence, denying this affects God's actual existence is metaphysically confused.
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2.
The distinction between epistemic conclusions and metaphysical truth is artificial—justified credence tracks what's actually the case about reality.
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3.
Successful probabilistic arguments about empirical matters (disease diagnosis, quantum events) do establish metaphysical conclusions, not merely epistemic ones.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Probabilistic arguments use inductive reasoning, which can only justify degrees of belief, not metaphysical truths about reality.
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2.
Rational credence reflects epistemic justification relative to evidence, while metaphysical claims require ontological status independent of observers.
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3.
Even if God's existence has high posterior probability given evidence, this describes rational confidence, not God's actual metaphysical nature.
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