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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Probability functions that assign probability 1 to contingent claims should be considered mere abbreviations for proper, logically explicit, non-enthymematic, inductive support relations.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.De Finetti's representation theorem shows probability-1 assignments encode genuine epistemic commitments, not mere notational shortcuts.
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    • 2.If a probability-1 assignment were merely abbreviational, updating via conditionalization on its negation would be coherent, but it produces undefined results.
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    • 3.Undefinability under conditionalization reveals a substantive logical role, not an eliminable convenience.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Levi's epistemology treats probability-1 assignments as expressions of full belief within a corpus, carrying genuine inferential weight.
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    • 2.Treating full beliefs as abbreviations collapses the distinction between settled and unsettled epistemic states, which Levi argues is indispensable to rational inquiry.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Probabilistic logicians commonly assign probability 1 to provisionally accepted contingent claims to avoid repeatedly writing them as premises.
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    • 2.When P(B|C) = 1, then P(A|B·C) = P(A|C), making the convention computationally convenient.
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    • 3.This convenience does not reflect genuine logical or evidential status of the contingent claim.
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