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    Propositions must have structures of the sort Frege and R... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Propositions must have structures of the sort Frege and Russell described.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Meaningful sentences can be true or false depending on how the world is.
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    • 2.The very possibility of such meaningful sentences requires propositions with Fregean/Russellian structures.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Russellian structured propositions face the 'unity of the proposition' problem: no account adequately explains what binds constituents into a truth-apt whole.
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    • 2.Frege's solution via the concept/object distinction generates a vicious regress, as Kerry's objection and subsequent literature demonstrate.
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    • 3.A theory that cannot solve its own constitutive problem—propositional unity—lacks sufficient theoretical warrant to be treated as necessary.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Propositionless semantic theories (e.g., Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics) account for sentential meaning without positing structured abstract objects.
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    • 2.If meaning can be fully explained by compositional truth conditions without appealing to propositions, then positing Fregean/Russellian structures is ontologically superfluous.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of Language

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A theory that cannot solve its own constitutive problem—propositional unity—lack...Frege's solution via the concept/object distinction generates a vicious regress,...If meaning can be fully explained by compositional truth conditions without appe...Meaningful sentences can be true or false depending on how the world is.
    +3 moreShow less
    Propositionless semantic theories (e.g., Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics...Russellian structured propositions face the 'unity of the proposition' problem: ...The very possibility of such meaningful sentences requires propositions with Fre...

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: logical-form
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    This invited the thought that other philosophical puzzles might dissolve if we properly understood the logical forms of our claims. Ludwig Wittgenstein argued, in his influential Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that: (i) the very possibility of meaningful sentences, which can be true or false depending on how the world is, requires propositions with structures of the sort that Frege and Russell were getting at; (ii) all propositions are logical compounds of—and thus analyzable into—atomic prop
    Extraction notes

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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit