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    Pure Coordination games may have multiple equilibria. — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Players in Pure Coordination games need focal points in addition to team reasoning to know which equilibrium offers the less risky prospect for social stabilization.

    Pure Coordination games may have multiple equilibria.

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityCausation

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    Social Contract1 linkedJustice & Punishment

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    Players in Pure Coordination games need focal points in addition to team reasoni...Social stabilization requires selecting among equilibria based on risk.Team reasoning alone does not distinguish between equilibria in Pure Coordinatio...

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    Crucially, here the transformation requires more than mere team reasoning. The players also need focal points to know which of the two Pure Coordination equilibria offers the less risky prospect for social stabilization (Binmore 2008). In fact, Bacharach and his executors are interested in the relationship between Pure Coordination games and Hi-Lo games for a special reason. It does not seem to imply any criticism of NE as a solution concept that it doesn’t favor one strategy vector over anoth

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