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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Putnam's functionalism holds that higher-level kinds are defined by causal-functional roles, not by any particular physical realization.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Causal-functional roles depend on context and observer interests, making them unsuitable for objective scientific kind-definitions.
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    • 2.Two systems with identical functional organization but different physical substrates may have crucially different causal powers and modal properties.
      ?

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    • 3.Functionalism struggles with phenomenal consciousness: a system perfectly replicating pain's functional role may lack subjective experience entirely.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Multiple physical systems (brains, silicon computers) exhibit identical functional organizations yet differ physically, supporting role-based identity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Mental states like pain are individuated by what they do (cause avoidance, trigger responses) rather than by C-fiber activation specifically.
      ?

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    • 3.Defining kinds by intrinsic physics makes biology and psychology species-dependent; functional definitions enable universal psychological laws.
      ?

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