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Inverse View
It is not the case that Qualia are intrinsic, non-relational properties of conscious states, not reducible to functional or causal roles (Block's 'phenomenal consciousness').
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
We only recognize qualia through their functional roles and effects on cognition; intrinsic properties are epistemically inaccessible.
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2.
Spectrum inversion and philosophical zombies are conceivable but metaphysically impossible given our understanding of consciousness.
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3.
The apparent irreducibility of qualia reflects explanatory gaps in our current theories, not fundamental non-functional properties.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
The subjective redness of red is directly knowable through experience but invisible to third-person functional descriptions alone.
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2.
Two systems could have identical functional roles yet differ in phenomenal character, as conceivable in spectrum inversion scenarios.
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3.
Explaining neural correlates of qualia differs from explaining why those correlates produce subjective experience at all.
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