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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Quiddities can be physically efficacious even if a single type of physical disposition might have been grounded by a distinct quiddity from the quiddity that actually grounds it

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.If quiddities are intrinsic categorical properties with no necessary dispositional profile, they cannot constitute genuine grounds for specific causal powers.
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    • 2.Grounding requires a necessary connection between the ground and what it grounds, so a quiddity that could equally ground any disposition grounds none in particular.
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    • 3.A property that is causally inert in every possible world where it exists cannot become efficacious merely by contingent association with a disposition (cf. Alexander's dictum).
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Humean contingency of causal relations applies to causal relata, not to the grounding relation between a property and its causal profile.
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    • 2.Allowing quiddities to contingently ground dispositions collapses into epiphenomenalism about quiddities, since the disposition, not the quiddity, does all explanatory causal work.
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    • 3.This mirrors Jackson and Chalmers's conceivability arguments: if the same physical dispositions are conceivable without the quiddity, the quiddity adds no causal-explanatory content.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Causal relations do not in general hold with metaphysical necessity
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    • 2.There is no requirement that the relationship between quiddities and dispositions must hold with metaphysical necessity for quiddities to be physically efficacious
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