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It is not the case that Quine argued in 'On What There Is' that positing irreducibly distinct ontological spheres multiplies entities beyond necessity and violates parsimony.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Some domains exhibit genuinely distinct causal properties: abstract entities causally inert, physical entities causally efficacious—conflating them obscures real differences.
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2.
Parsimony itself is theoretically underdetermined; Quine provides no principled argument for why ontological parsimony should override explanatory adequacy.
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3.
Mathematical and logical truths require abstract objects to preserve their indispensability; eliminating them requires revisionist mathematics with severe costs.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Ontological parsimony is a rational principle: simpler theories requiring fewer fundamental kinds are preferable when empirically equivalent.
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2.
Multiple irreducible spheres (abstract objects, physical objects, etc.) create explanatory redundancy without improving predictive power.
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3.
Univocal existence criteria across domains is methodologically simpler than defending distinct existence standards for different entity-types.
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