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It is not the case that Quine's indispensability criterion demands that ontological commitment track explanatory necessity, not conceptual convenience.
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Reason for
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1.
The distinction between explanatory necessity and conceptual convenience is itself vague and theory-laden, not objectively determinate.
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2.
Mathematical objects appear indispensable to our best physics explanations, challenging whether the criterion excludes abstracts coherently.
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3.
What counts as 'necessary' for explanation depends on background assumptions that vary across epistemic frameworks and contexts.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Scientific theories commit us only to entities genuinely required by their best explanations, not mere mathematical conveniences.
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2.
Distinguishing explanatory necessity from conceptual convenience prevents ontological bloat and maintains parsimony principles.
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3.
Entities like numbers may be conceptually useful but explanatorily dispensable if science can be reformulated without them.
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