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    Railton's naturalistic consequentialism reduces 'good' to... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Teleological theories are committed to claims about value.

    Railton's naturalistic consequentialism reduces 'good' to non-normative facts about idealized desire-satisfaction, eliminating irreducible evaluative commitments.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Normative facts are metaphysically puzzling; reducing them to natural facts avoids mysterious non-physical properties.
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    • 2.Idealized desire-satisfaction captures what we care about; what survives rational reflection deserves normative weight.
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    • 3.Other reductive theories (e.g., moral naturalism) successfully eliminate seeming irreducibles without losing explanatory power.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Idealization conditions themselves embed evaluative judgments about which desires count, making the reduction circular.
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    • 2.Someone might rationally desire things we'd judge bad (power, domination); desire-satisfaction alone doesn't capture wrongness.
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    • 3.The naturalistic reduction may explain desire but cannot ground normativity—why should facts about desires obligate us morally?
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    Connections

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    Consequentialism1 linkedVirtue Ethics1 linked

    Related

    Idealization conditions themselves embed evaluative judgments about which desire...Idealized desire-satisfaction captures what we care about; what survives rationa...Normative facts are metaphysically puzzling; reducing them to natural facts avoi...Other reductive theories (e.g., moral naturalism) successfully eliminate seeming...
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    Someone might rationally desire things we'd judge bad (power, domination); desir...Teleological theories are committed to claims about value.The naturalistic reduction may explain desire but cannot ground normativity—why ...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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