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    Rationality is constitutive of the mental — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Supports→Something counts as a mind only if it meets certain rational standards

    Rationality is constitutive of the mental

    Consciousness & Mind
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    Consciousness & Mind

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Psychological attributions are only appropriate for entities that qualify as min...Something counts as a mind only if it meets certain rational standards

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    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    Rationality is claimed by Davidson to be constitutive of the mental in the sense that something only counts as being a mind—and thus an appropriate object of psychological attributions—if it meets up to certain rational standards. This constitutive idea is open to weaker and stronger interpretations. The weaker interpretation sees only very basic logical, semantic or conceptual constraints on understanding others—and thus what is constitutive of minds—which allows for significant variation as on

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