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    Rationality of belief does not require that the belief be... — Carmelics
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    Supports→It is possible to argue that enumerative induction is unjustified while simultaneously agreeing that mathematicians are rational to believe Goldbach's Conjecture on the basis of available evidence.

    Rationality of belief does not require that the belief be grounded in enumerative induction.

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    Evidence that is biased against a hypothesis strengthens rather than weakens the...It is possible to argue that enumerative induction is unjustified while simultan...The bias in the sample of positive instances of Goldbach's Conjecture is directe...

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    Sextus's argument against enumerative induction is not strictly sound81%It is possible to argue that enumerative induction is unjustified whil...80%Having beliefs requires possessing the concept of belief.78%Having beliefs requires having the concept of belief.78%

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    Thus consideration of the partition function has not brought a proof of GC any closer. However it does allow us to give an interesting twist to the argument of the previous section. The graph suggests that the hardest test cases for GC are likely to occur among the smallest numbers; hence the inductive sample for GC is biased, but it is biased against the chances of GC. Mathematicians’ confidence in the truth of GC is not based purely on enumerative induction. The values taken by the partition f

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