Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Reduction requires more than mere derivation; it requires... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Postulating a mind-brain identity as a brute fact would not suffice for reduction, even though it would suffice for the relevant sort of derivation.

    Reduction requires more than mere derivation; it requires an explanatory connection that is not a brute-fact postulate.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Even a hard-core physicalist accepts that a brute-fact identity suffices for der...Postulating a mind-brain identity as a brute fact would not suffice for reductio...

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consciousness & Mind
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    S does not need to actually draw the inference, but the inferential su...78%Some explanations exceed mere brute-fact postulates without achieving ...78%Asymmetrical explanatory structure can obtain even among necessary tru...77%One also needs justification for believing that F makes probable that ...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: scientific-reduction
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, even if two theories instantiate a relation of the sort required by Nagel’s model, we should not speak of proper reduction, if as a matter of epistemic possibility the connection between the domains of the two theories remains too loose to support the materialist claims. Levine (1993) gives this an epistemological interpretation; Chalmers (1996) seems to suggest that the epistemic possibility of two concepts coming apart implies that there is a metaphysical possibility of the two propertie

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective