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    Reflective introspection on experience is only possible b... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Reflective introspection on experience is only possible because the subject is already experientially familiar with that experience via pre-reflective awareness.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.When a subject reflects, she reflects on something with which she is already experientially familiar.
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    • 2.Pre-reflective awareness precedes and grounds any subsequent reflective act.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Reflection can constitute experience rather than merely re-present it, as Sartre himself acknowledges in impure reflection's distorting role.
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    • 2.If reflection constitutively shapes what it apprehends, the pre-reflective datum it allegedly accesses is not preserved intact but transformed.
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    • 3.A constitutively transformative reflective act cannot be grounded in prior familiarity with the very content it brings into being.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Higher-Order Thought theories (Rosenthal) hold that a mental state becomes conscious precisely when accompanied by a thought about it, requiring no prior pre-reflective awareness.
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    • 2.If a state can first become experientially available through the reflective or higher-order act itself, pre-reflective familiarity is not a necessary precondition for reflective access.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A constitutively transformative reflective act cannot be grounded in prior famil...Higher-Order Thought theories (Rosenthal) hold that a mental state becomes consc...If a state can first become experientially available through the reflective or h...If reflection constitutively shapes what it apprehends, the pre-reflective datum...
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    Pre-reflective awareness precedes and grounds any subsequent reflective act.Reflection can constitute experience rather than merely re-present it, as Sartre...When a subject reflects, she reflects on something with which she is already exp...

    Similar

    A subject's epistemic access to her own experience is primarily a matt...85%When a subject introspectively reflects on her perceptual experience, ...85%Every experience stands in the required introspective indiscriminabili...84%Whether an experience is experienced as mine does not depend on someth...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-consciousness-phenomenological
    View source passageHide passage
    It seems clear that the objects of my visual perception are intersubjectively accessible in the sense that they can in principle be the objects of another’s perception. A subject’s perceptual experience itself, however, is given in a unique way to the subject herself. Although two people, A and B, can perceive a numerically identical object, they each have their own distinct perceptual experience of it; just as they cannot share each other’s pain, they cannot literally share these perceptual exp
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit