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    Refuting external-world skepticism is not one of Kant's a... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Strawson's interpretation of the B-Deduction is motivated by anti-skeptical concerns not present in Kant's own aims

    Refuting external-world skepticism is not one of Kant's aims for the B-Deduction argument

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    Strawson conceives the Deduction as showing that the skeptic about the external ...Strawson's interpretation of the B-Deduction is motivated by anti-skeptical conc...

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    Cartesian-style skeptical arguments exist against external-world reali...84%Kant's Refutation of Idealism fails to provide leverage against extern...84%Skepticism about the external world is self-undermining, because the f...82%Strawson conceives the Deduction as showing that the skeptic about the...81%

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    SEP: kant-transcendental
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    According to one widespread reading of the B-Deduction, §§15–20 comprise a an argument whose only assumption is the premise about self-consciousness that Kant defends in §16. Strawson, for example, is a proponent of such an interpretation (1966), as are Robert Paul Wolff (1963), Jonathan Bennett (1966), Henry Allison (1983), Edwin McCann (1985), and Dennis Schulting (2012a). Demonstrating that we represent objects or an objective world has a key role in most versions of this reading. On Strawson

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