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    Carmelics

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    It is not the case that Rejecting the common-kind assumption dissolves the inference that sense-data in illusions reveal the non-material nature of all perceptual objects.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Even without the common-kind assumption, illusions present qualitative properties (redness, roundness) that physical processes alone seem unable to fully constitute.
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    • 2.Dissolving the inference requires an alternative account of why illusions appear identical to veridical perceptions—physical explanation faces the hard problem.
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    • 3.Rejecting common-kind thinking doesn't address the binding problem: how scattered neural activity unifies into coherent sense-data experiences.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The common-kind assumption requires sense-data and physical objects to share fundamental metaphysical properties, but this conflates epistemic with ontological categories.
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    • 2.Illusions can be explained by neural misfiring or misinterpretation without inferring non-material sense-data exist as distinct ontological entities.
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    • 3.Rejecting this assumption allows physicalism about perception: illusions reveal properties of brain states, not immaterial intermediaries.
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