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    Relativizing outcomes while keeping comparative ranking i... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Samuel Scheffler argues that truly agent-relative permissions require abandoning the consequentialist structure of outcome-ranking entirely, not merely relativizing it.

    Relativizing outcomes while keeping comparative ranking intact still treats agent-relative concerns as variations on a single evaluative metric, obscuring their fundamental distinctness.

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    Key Terms

    Agent-relative concerns(as used in ethics)
    Values or goals that matter differently depending on *who* is pursuing them—for example, your own happiness might matter more to you than it matters to someone else, and that's treated as perfectly reasonable.
    Comparative ranking(the starting point of the argument being criticized)
    Arranging things in order from better to worse, or more to less—saying that X is preferable to Y.
    Evaluative metric(as used in ethics and philosophy of value)
    A single standard or measuring stick we use to judge and compare how good or valuable different things are.
    Fundamental distinctness(as used in metaphysics and ethics)
    The quality of being basically different in kind, not just different in degree—like how a dog and a fish aren't just 'different amounts of the same thing' but fundamentally different types of animals.

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    Relativizing(as the method applied to semantics)
    Making something dependent on or changeable based on different backgrounds or contexts, rather than treating it as absolute or universal.

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    Samuel Scheffler argues that truly agent-relative permissions require abandoning...

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    Samuel Scheffler argues that truly agent-relative permissions require abandoning...

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