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    Representationalism grounds qualia-entailments in intenti... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Orthodox phenomenism is inferior to representationalism and sense-datum theory with respect to explaining entailment relations between qualia-statements.

    Representationalism grounds qualia-entailments in intentional content structure: if red entails colored, this follows from representational content relations (Tye 1995).

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Qualia necessarily have structure (red differs from blue in specific ways), and only representational content has the requisite structure.
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    • 2.If qualia were non-representational properties, the entailment that red-experience entails colored-experience would be brute and inexplicable.
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    • 3.Content relations between 'red' and 'colored' representations naturally explain why the quale of red entails the quale of colored.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.A creature could represent red without experiencing colored-qualia (inverted or absent color consciousness), breaking the entailment link.
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    • 2.Qualia-entailments may derive from non-representational phenomenal properties (intrinsic structural similarity) rather than content relations.
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    • 3.Intentional content is itself abstract; it's unclear how abstract representations ground concrete phenomenal relations better than qualia do.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    A creature could represent red without experiencing colored-qualia (inverted or ...Content relations between 'red' and 'colored' representations naturally explain ...If qualia were non-representational properties, the entailment that red-experien...Intentional content is itself abstract; it's unclear how abstract representation...
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    Orthodox phenomenism is inferior to representationalism and sense-datum theory w...Qualia necessarily have structure (red differs from blue in specific ways), and ...Qualia-entailments may derive from non-representational phenomenal properties (i...

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